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Abstract—We need more skilled cybersecurity pro-
fessionals because the number of cyber threats and
ingenuity of attackers is ever growing. Knowledge and
skills required for cyber defence can be developed and
exercised by lectures and lab sessions, or by active
learning, which is seen as a promising and attractive
alternative. In this paper, we present experience gained
from the preparation and execution of cyber defence ex-
ercises involving various participants in a cyber range.
The exercises follow a Red vs. Blue team format,
in which the Red team conducts malicious activities
against emulated networks and systems that have to be
defended by Blue teams of learners. Although this exer-
cise format is popular and used worldwide by numerous
organizers in practice, it has been sparsely researched.
We contribute to the topic by describing the general
exercise life cycle, covering the exercise’s development,
dry run, execution, evaluation, and repetition. Each
phase brings several challenges that exercise organizers
have to deal with. We present lessons learned that can
help organizers to prepare, run and repeat successful
events systematically, with lower effort and costs, and
avoid a trial-and-error approach that is often used.
I. Introduction
Information and communication systems are exposed
to an increasing number of attacks. Apart from simple
attacks conducted by hacktivists and inexperienced indi-
viduals that can be tracked down [1], there are professional
teams backed by organized crime groups or even govern-
ments [2] that carefully hide their activities. A shortage
in cyber security skills and cyber security professionals is
a critical vulnerability for companies and nations [3], [4].
Cyber security can be taught not only using conven-
tional methods, including classroom lectures, seminars or
home assignments, but also by hands-on experience. In
recent years, there has been a significant growth of hands-
on competitions, challenges, and exercises [5], [6]. It is
believed that they enable participants to effectively gain or
practise diverse cyber security skills in an attractive way.
The most popular events are Capture The Flag (CTF)
games [5] and Cyber Defence eXercises (CDX) [6]. While
CTF games focus on attacking, defending or both, CDXs
train solely the defence. CTFs which put participants
in the role of the attacker support the development of
adversarial thinking that is necessary for anticipating
future offensive actions [7]. CDXs enable participants to
experience cyber attacks first-hand.
Although both types of events are prepared and carried
out by numerous sponsors for a large number of partici-
pants, there are only a few public research papers dealing
with the design of an exercise in a cyber range. Gran̊asen
and Andersson conducted a case study on measuring team
effectiveness in Baltic Cyber Shield 2010, a multi-national
civil-military CDX [8]. They described the instrumenta-
tion and collection of data from the exercise’s infras-
tructure and participants in order to provide situational
awareness for organizers during the exercise. The Spanish
National Cybersecurity Institute proposed a taxonomy
of cyber exercises [9] which recognizes operations-based
exercises focused on incident response by participants
in technical and management roles. ISO/TC 223 effort
resulted into ISO 22398, which describe general guidelines
for exercises including basic terms and definitions [10]. Un-
fortunately, technical implementation details of an exercise
in a cyber range is out of scope of this standard.
In our work, we address the gap in the literature by
describing the life cycle of a complex cyber defence exercise
and challenges related to the exercise’s design, develop-
ment, execution and repeatability. This knowledge is based
on our experience gained by developing and delivering six
runs of a cyber defence exercise scenario with about 120
national and international learners between 2015 and 2017.
The exercises have been carried out in a cyber range we
are developing and continuously enhancing in order to suit
an exercise’s requirements.
This paper is organized into five sections. Section 2
provides an overview of existing platforms that can be used
as a vehicle for cyber exercises. Section 3 describes a cyber
defence exercise carried out in a cyber range. Section 4
reports on lessons learned through six runs of this exercise.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines future
work.
II. Hands-on learning environments
In this section, we give a brief overview of learning
environments that can be used in active learning of cyber
security. We have done a systematic literature review from
2013 to 2017 to cover recent advances and innovations.
A. Generic testbeds
Generic testbeds provide a basic functionality for the
emulation of computer networks. Emulab/Netbed [11] is
a cluster testbed providing services for the deployment
of virtual appliances, configuration of flexible network
topologies and emulation of various network character-
istics. Emulab allocates computing resources for a spec-
ified network and instantiates it at a dedicated hardware
infrastructure. CyberVAN [12] experimentation testbed
provides a virtualized environment where arbitrary ap-
plications running on Xen-based virtual machines can be
interconnected by arbitrary network topologies. It employs
network simulators such as OPNET, QualNet, ns-2, or ns-
3, so the network traffic of emulated hosts travels through
the simulated network. This hybrid emulation enables
the simulation of large strategic networks approximating
a large ISP network.
B. Lightweight platforms
Several lightweight platforms have been developed for
cyber security training. While some of them evolved from
the generic testbeds, others were designed from scratch
with different needs in mind. Avatao [13], [14] is a web-
based online e-learning platform offering IT security chal-
lenges (hands-on exercises), which can be organized to
a path which leads to fulfilling an ultimate learning ob-
jective. CTF365 [15] (Capture The Flag 365) is a training
platform that leverages gamification to improve retention
rate and speed up the learning and training curve. In the
Hacking-Lab [16] online platform, teams of participants
have to perform several tasks simultaneously; keep applica-
tions up and running, find and patch vulnerabilities, solve
challenges and attack their competitors’ applications.The
iCTF framework [17] has been developed at The Uni-
versity of California for hosting their iCTF, the largest
capture the flag competition in the world. InCTF [18]
is a modification of the iCTF framework. Using Docker
containers instead of virtual machines enhances the overall
game experience and simplifies the organization of attack-
defence competitions for a larger number of participants.
C. Cyber ranges
Cyber ranges represent complex virtual environments
that are used not only for cyberwarfare training, but also
for cybertechnology development, forensic analysis and
other cyber-related issues. There is an extensive survey
of state-of-the-art cyber ranges and testbeds [19]. One
very popular cyber range is DETER/DeterLab [20], [21],
which is based on Emulab and was started with the goal
of advancing cyber security research and education in
2004. Nowadays, there exist many other cyber ranges, e. g.,
National Cyber Range (NCR) [22], Michigan Cyber Range
(MCR) [23], SimSpace Cyber Range [24], EDURange [25],
or KYPO Cyber Range [26].
III. Cyber defence exercise
We have designed a one day Red vs. Blue cyber defence
exercise for 50 participants. It was inspired by the Locked
Shield exercise [27] organized by NATO Cooperative Cy-
ber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. We named our
exercise Cyber Czech and it has been executed six times
so far (2015–2017). Cyber Czech is a hands-on exercise
improving the technical and soft skills of security profes-
sionals grouped in six Blue teams. It requires substantial
preparation effort from the organizers and a dedicated
cyber range infrastructure. The exercise involves:
• cloud-based exercise infrastructure (sandboxes),
• training objectives, story, and an exercise scenario,
• participants grouped in teams (Red, Blue, White and
Green),
• a physical cyber range facility hosting all participants.
This section explains the cyber defence exercise’s com-
ponents, terms used and definitions, we will use through-
out the rest of the paper.
A. Cyber range infrastructure
The technical part of the cyber exercise relies on a cyber
range itself and supportive infrastructure for communica-
tion within the exercise and the evaluation of participants’
actions. The cyber range emulates a complex network
setup in a contained environment. Therefore, participants
can realistically interact with an assigned host or network
infrastructure, and their actions cannot interfere with
the operational environment. The following text describes
a high-level view of the architecture of the KYPO [26]
cyber range, which we use in the Cyber Czech exercise.
Sandboxes represent a low-level layer of the cyber range.
They encapsulate isolated computer networks where users
can safely perform their cyber security tasks. Sandboxes
are based on virtual appliances placed in a cloud, which
makes their allocation, replication, and maintenance easy.
Despite the virtualization, neither users nor running ap-

















Figure 1. The scheme of the cyber exercise network.
The scheme of the cyber exercise network is depicted
in Figure 1. This network serves as a virtual battlefield
with approximately 110 interconnected hosts and other
Figure 2. The topology of the exercise network, as seen by participants in the front-end application, and open remote desktop connection
to selected host in the separate window.
network facilities. It is divided into two subnetworks: i)
a global network hosting attackers and common network
infrastructure, such as DNS and e-mail servers; this net-
work simulates the global Internet, and ii) the networks of
Blue teams representing the defended network with crit-
ical and vulnerable services. Networks of Blue teams are
further divided into a demilitarized zone (DMZ), desktops,
servers, and industrial control systems (ICS).
Cyber range built-in monitoring services cover network
traffic statistics, flow data, and full-packet capture. In
addition to these off-the-shelf data monitoring services,
learners may install their own monitoring applications as
a part of their activities inside their sandbox.
Next, we use a generic logging infrastructure integrated
into the monitoring services. Each host is configured
to forward log messages to the central logging server.
A processing chain of additional tools is deployed in order
to provide real-time access to the normalized log data
from the exercise infrastructure. The state of the host’s
network services is periodically checked and events related
to service state changes are logged into the central logging
server.
The logging infrastructure is used by a scoring system
that has been developed to provide feedback to partici-
pants during exercise. Penalty points are either computed
automatically from events processed by the logging infras-
tructure (e. g., penalty for inaccessible services) or entered
manually. A total score can be shown to participants in
real-time. Monitored and logged data is an invaluable
input for exercise management, evaluation and further
research.
The front-end application provides a web-based user in-
terface to interact with the cyber range. The web interface
supports the design and management of sandboxes, single
sign-on, remote desktop access etc. We have designed
complex interactive visualizations to provide real-time
feedback to participants, to provide insights into adversary
behaviour, and to build effective situational awareness.
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of a sandbox from the Cyber
Czech exercise, as was seen by participants in the front-end
application.
B. Exercise objectives, story and scenario
The designed exercise is focused on defending critical
information infrastructure against skilled and coordinated
attackers. Similarly to other defence exercises, learners are
put into the role of members of emergency security teams
which are sent into organizations to recover compromised
networks. They have to secure the IT infrastructure, in-
vestigate possible data exfiltration and collaborate with
other emergency teams, the coordinator of the operation
and media representatives.
Learners are provided with a background story to intro-
duce them to the situation before they enter the compro-
mised networks. This is very important since the exercise is
not set in a real environment and learners have no previous
knowledge who is who in the fictitious scenario (e. g., users
in their organization, popular news portal, superordinate
security team). They are also provided with technical
facts related to the exercise network: network topology
including “their” network that will be defended, network
architecture and current setup, and access credentials, etc.
Before the actual exercise, learners access their emulated
network for several hours to get familiar with the exercise.
The exercise is driven by a scenario which includes the
actions of attackers and assignments for defenders pre-
pared by the organizers. The attackers exploit specific
vulnerabilities left in the compromised network in a fixed
order which follows a common life cycle in the critical

















Figure 3. Common attack phases: À reconnaissance the victim’s
network; Á exploitation of the unveiled vulnerabilities; Â escalation
of privileges on compromised computers and further exploitation; Ã
completing attackers’ mission, e. g., shutdown a control system.
The first attack phase involves reconnaissance (scanning
of active systems or open network ports). Next, the attack-
ers try to gain access to the machines providing public
services (exploitation phase). This is followed by multiple
escalations of privileges (accessing segments with internal
machines), which enables the completing attackers’ mis-
sion (shutdown of a critical application). The attackers
use a mix of recent and ubiquitous attacks/vulnerabilities
that are public and well-known. This is complemented by
special tailored malware samples which emulate sophisti-
cated attacks. The completion of each successful attack
is recorded by the attackers. On top of that, learners
should also answer media requests. The performance of
each learners’ team is scored based on successful attacks
or their mitigation, the availability of specified critical
services and the quality of reporting and communication.
C. Participant roles
Participants are divided into four groups according to
their skills, role, and tasks in the exercise. These are now
listed according to those commonly used in other cyber
exercises:
• Green team – a group of operators responsible for
the exercise infrastructure (the sandbox in this case).
They configure all virtual computers and networks,
monitoring and scoring infrastructure. The Green
team also monitors the sandbox’s health and fixes
crashes and infrastructure issues if needed.
• White team – exercise managers, referees, organizers,
and instructors. They provide the background story,
exercise rules and framework for the Red team and
Blue teams’ competition. The White team assigns
tasks (called injects) to the Blue teams and thus
simulates media, the operation coordinator, and law
enforcement agencies. They might also act as instruc-
tors and provide basic hints to Blue teams if needed.
• Red team – plays the role of attackers and consists
of cyber security professionals. They do not attack
targets in the infrastructure of a Blue team randomly,
but carefully follow a predefined attack scenario to
equally load the Blue teams. This means the Red team
exploits vulnerabilities left in a Blue team’s network.
They should not use any other arbitrary means of
attack against the Blue teams. They are also not
allowed to attack the service infrastructure. Based on
the success of attacks, the Red team assigns penalties
to Blue teams. Penalties are assigned manually via
a web interface since the amount of awarded points is
based on non-trivial factors that need expert review.
• Blue team – learners responsible for securing com-
promised networks and dealing with the Red team’s
attacks. They have to follow the exercise’s rules and
local cyber law. The learners are grouped in several
Blue teams.
Interactions between the four groups of participants are
depicted in Figure 4.















Figure 4. Exercise participants, their interactions and tasks.






















































































































































































Figure 5. Cyber exercise life cycle in time. Coloured bars show relative effort spent by members of White, Red, Green and Blue teams in
respective phases of the life cycle. The four numbers on the left express the size of particular team in the exercise. The mapping to the
PDCA cycle is depicted by coloured lines below the life cycle phases.
IV. Lessons learned
Cyber exercises last several hours or days but their
preparation typically takes several months involving ex-
perts from various fields – IT administrators, penetration
testers, incident handlers, managers, legal experts etc.
The exercise life cycle consists of several phases that can
be mapped to a Plan–Do–Check–Adjust (PDCA) cycle.
Carefully planning and considering the relationship of all
phases may save a significant amount of invested effort
and costs. Figure 5 shows the involvement of all teams
and effort spent through the cyber exercise life cycle.
A. Preparation
The preparation phase consumes the majority of work
effort and time. First, we have to set the learning and
training objectives of the exercise; elaborate the back-
ground story and develop an exercise scenario consisting
of tasks and injects for the Red team and White team –
including end users, media and legal representatives. An
outline of the exercise scenario is then used for preparing
network infrastructure that will be defended by the Blue
teams. A more detailed scenario is then used for setting
up scoring components: their general weights (e. g., service
availability vs. successful attacks vs. reporting) and score
structure for every particular service, attack, or inject
(e. g., if the Red team is successful in a given attack, the
Blue team will be penalized by an exact number of points;
if the Red team was successful only partially, the Blue
team will be penalized only by a portion of the amount of
full points).
In parallel, learners are invited and asked for self-
assessment of their skills relevant to the exercise. Based on
their input, the White team starts to create Blue teams
with balanced skills and experience. The described steps
so far correspond to the Plan and Do phases in the PDCA
cycle.
Once the network infrastructure and hosts are config-
ured according to the proposed scenario, they are deployed
in a cyber range sandbox. Tasks and injects of the scenario
are tested by members of Red team and White team in an
intensive full day workshop (hackathon). This is without
the presence of Blue teams. The hackathon represents
the Do and the Check phases of the PDCA cycle. After
that, there is the last chance to modify the scenario and
configuration of exercise infrastructure (the Adjust phase).
In our experience, the most challenging tasks in the
preparation phase are:
• Setting learning objectives with respect to the expected
readiness of prospective learners – the organizers have
limited information about learners’ skills before the
actual exercise. This is a completely different situation
to a typical higher education where learners’ readiness
can be determined by the portfolio of courses passed
by the learners. We strongly recommend considering
a profile of the prospective learners in order to balance
learning objectives and learners’ proficiency. The self-
assessment questionnaires may provide useful infor-
mation. The key success factor is to ask questions
which are relevant to particular skills that will be
exercised, e. g., What tools do you use for detecting
cyber attacks? instead of What is your experience with
the detection of cyber attacks?
• Creating balanced teams – one of the main aspects
of the exercise is to build a sense of teamwork. We
advise paying a large amount of attention to creating
teams of learners who possess the necessary skills.
For instance, if the self-assessment inputs indicate
that some learners are experts in one area, it is
recommended to distribute them to all teams equally
and complement them with experts in another area.
• Sandbox configuration documents – continually edit-
ing and updating the specification of used systems,
network configurations and vulnerabilities is crucial
for the successful and smooth preparation of the
sandbox. The description should be done using an
automation tool such as Ansible [28] to assure its long-
term maintainability. Any static documentation (e. g.,
a wiki page, readme file) is error prone, and becomes
outdated very soon.
B. Dry run
The dry run is a complete test of the proposed cyber
exercise to get diverse feedback on it. We invite different
groups of learners (testing Blue teams) that participate in
a pilot exercise. Dry run follows the same schedule and
timing as final exercise to rehearse the entire scenario and
interaction between Red, White and Green teams, even
though it consumes a considerable amount of manpower.
It is a mix of Do and Adjust PDCA phases.
We learned that adjusting the scoring system based on
the dry run might be misleading if the expertise and size
of the Blue teams participating in the dry run is not
similar to learners. The progress of the dry run may be
also influenced by various exercise conditions and events
that may not happen in the final execution.
C. Execution
The execution phase starts with a familiarization pe-
riod that enables Blue teams to learn about the exercise
infrastructure that has to be defended. The Red team
takes no action in this period, so the Blue teams have
an opportunity to harden “their” infrastructure. Then the
actual exercise starts according to the scenario that is
strictly followed by members of the Red and White teams.
Once the exercise ends, representatives of the Red, White
and Green teams provide a very short assessment of Blue
teams’ performance during the whole exercise (hot wash-
up). This is very desirable since Blue teams can see the
final score and can only estimate the content of the exercise
scenario.
We identified five challenges related to the execution
phase:
• The level of guidance by organizers – although cre-
ating balanced teams should help to equate learn-
ers’ proficiency and exercise difficulty, the learners
sometimes struggle even though they try their best
individually and as a team. We advocate providing
some hints by the White team in order to keep the
learners in the exercise flow and not to get frustrated
because they are stuck at one point. However, the
guidance should be provided to all teams equally to
preserve fair play.
• Exercise situational awareness for learners – the gen-
eral aim of the exercise is to detect and mitigate cy-
ber attacks. Providing exercise situational awareness
for the learners might be contradictory to this aim.
We provide only a basic indication of the learners’
performance assessed by the White team and Red
team by displaying a real-time total score of all teams
on a shared scoreboard. This also proved to be an
important factor fuelling participants with stress as
well as a competitive mood.
• Exercise situational awareness for organizers – situa-
tional awareness for the White team is very important
in the familiarization period where no attacks are
conducted against the infrastructure defended by the
Blue teams. At the beginning, all systems are intact.
Blue teams then reconfigure them to harden them
and prepare the infrastructure for attacks by the Red
team. The familiarization period is intentionally short
so learners are under pressure and they make a num-
ber of mistakes. Monitoring the exercise’s infrastruc-
ture (by the Green team) enables the White team to
provide hints for Blue teams in these cases. However,
this does not apply in the exercise itself because there
may be states that monitoring evaluated as wrong but
they were caused by a proper operational decision by
a Blue team.
• Automation of the attacks and injects – since the
exercise scenario is fixed and rigid, Red and White
teams may benefit from semi-automated routines that
execute the predefined attacks and injects. However,
there might be an unexpected situation in which
the assistance of a human operator is essential. For
instance, the routines expect a file at the default
location but the Blue team moved it to another place
during the exercise. In addition, we are not aware
of any generator of network traffic that can emulate
typical Internet users, and that can be easily deployed
in the exercise infrastructure.
• Service access to the exercise’s infrastructure – to rec-
ognize an exercise infrastructure failure from scenario
progression (e. g., Red team’s attack or Blue team’s
misconfiguration), the Green team needs a service
access to all sandbox components. The service access
must be clearly defined in the rulebook, no attack will
originate from this account, and the Red team does
not have access to this account.
D. Evaluation
The exercise life cycle ends with an evaluation. It con-
sists of an assessment of team actions and performance
during the exercise, feedback survey and evaluation (after-
action) workshop for the learners, and gathering lessons
learned by the organizers.
The most visible part of this phase is the evalua-
tion workshop attended by the Blue teams which lasts
about a half day. Other parts of this phase are done by
the White and Red teams and require much more time
and preparation effort. The White team assesses e-mail
communication during the exercise with respect to the
non-technical learning objectives (reporting, information
sharing, legal). The Red team prepares an overview of
its success in attacks against particular teams and best
practices related to the attacks used in the exercise. Both
teams benefit from data collected by and entered into the
scoring application. Furthermore, the Green team stores
all collected logs during the exercise of other teams if
needed. Feedback provided by the Blue teams in the survey
before the evaluation workshop is also incorporated.
All parts of the evaluation (except gathering the lessons
learned by the organizers) can be, again, seen as the PDCA
Plan, Do and Check phases and the lessons as an input
for the Adjust.
Through several runs of the exercise, we realized that
learning also happens in the evaluation phase. This applies
particularly to novices and learners who rated the exercise
as difficult. The evaluation workshop shows the exercise
scenario and timeline from the perspective of the Red
team and White team. It is the only opportunity when
the learners can authoritatively learn about attacks used
by the Red team. They can discuss their approach in par-
ticular situations and phases. Until this point, they were
only able to see the results of their experimentation during
the exercise without an explanation of why something
happened. We, therefore, recommend not to underestimate
this part of the exercise and deliver analysis and lessons
that will have value for the learners. For instance, a hand-
out with best practices for system hardening might be
useful in the daily routine of the participants.
E. Repetition
The repetition phase is an instantiation of the exercise
sandbox, the execution of the existing exercise scenario for
a new group of learners followed by the evaluation. Using
the lessons collected in the previous phase, the repetition
can be conducted with much less effort and manpower
than the first run. It is also possible to skip the dry run
phase after one or two repetitions. The repetition includes
all phases of PDCA cycle.
V. Conclusions and future work
We have presented a defence exercise deployed in a cy-
ber range and lessons learned from six runs for about
120 adult learners of various expertise, backgrounds and
nationalities. The learners have no previous knowledge of
the defended infrastructure and the organizers have very
limited information about learner’s skills and knowledge
before the exercise.
We identified a general life cycle of a cyber defence
exercise consisting of five phases: preparation, dry run,
execution, evaluation, and repetition. We have described
each phase and highlighted important lessons we have
learned. Considering these lessons can minimize trial-and-
error effort in the design, development, execution and
repetition of an exercise.
A. Experience and lessons learned
Finding the best strategy to achieve a cost-effective
and sustainable exercise is a very challenging goal. It is
a never-ending trade-off between approaching reality and
feasibility. Balancing each part of the life cycle allows the
creation of a sustainable exercise that can be iteratively
improved.
The preparation phase has the decisive influence on
final features of the exercise. It is vital to invest many
months of manpower into this phase. All systems emulated
in the exercise infrastructure must be ready including
exercise content, vulnerabilities, and misconfigurations at
the beginning of the exercise.
The initial version of the exercise produced in the prepa-
ration phase is not sufficient for executing successfully on
its own. It must be complemented with a dry run with real
learners. In our experience, the dry run verifies not only
the story of the exercise but also the ability to use the
exercise in repeatable deployments. Poor documentation
can cause a lot of problems when making changes in
a complex scenario and delay bug fixing and deployment.
Experience from the past exercises highlighted two chal-
lenges that we will investigate in our future work: i) how to
design prerequisite testing, and ii) how to provide deeper
feedback to the learners immediately after the exercise.
B. Future work
The limited information about prospective learners of an
exercise inspired our future research on diagnostic assess-
ment, particularly testing prerequisites for the exercise.
Matching learners proficiency and exercise difficulty is
a key success factor of the whole exercise. However, the
best current practice is announcing the prerequisite skills
and knowledge in free form, or acquiring input by self-
assessment questionnaires sent out before the exercise.
Both proved to be inaccurate. We are investigating meth-
ods of gaining objective information using short quizzes,
tests and practical tasks related to the learning objectives
of the exercise.
The scoring system produces valuable data that may
be used either to compare teams mutually, or to show
the progress of a team during the exercise. However, so
far, the data has been aggregated to a single scoring
board consisting of the current or final scores of all teams.
We aim to utilize the scoring data to provide better
feedback so that the learners can learn from their mistakes.
We plan to present continuous scoring statistics to the
learners immediately after the exercise in a well-considered
interactive way and analyse their physical behaviour (e. g.,
eye-tracking, mouse event recording) in order to catch the
interest of the learners. These techniques would expose
how much feedback helps them to get insight into the
passed exercise. We believe that the improved feedback
from the exercise may increase learners’ motivation to
attend further exercises.
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